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Abstract 
 
Separating management policy from the automated managers which interpret the policy 
facilitates the dynamic change of behaviour of a distributed management system.  This 
permits it to adapt to evolutionary changes in the system being managed and to new 
application requirements.   Changing the behaviour of automated managers can be 
achieved by changing the policy without have to reimplement them – this permits the 
reuse of the managers in different environments.    It is also useful to have a clear 
specification of the policy applying to human managers in an enterprise. 
 
This paper describes the work on policy which has come out of two related ESPRIT 
funded projects, SysMan and IDSM. Two classes of policy are elaborated – authorisation 
policies define what a manager is permitted to do and obligation policy define what a 
manager must do.  Policies are specified as objects which define a relationship between 
subjects (managers) and targets (managed objects).  Domains are used to group the objects 
to which a policy applies.  Policy objects also have attributes specifying the action to be 
performed and constraints limiting the applicability of the policy.  We show how a number 
of example policies can be modelled using these objects and briefly mention issues 
relating to policy hierarchy and conflicts between overlapping policies.  
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1 Introduction 
Distributed systems management1 involves monitoring the activity of a system, making 
management decisions and performing control actions to modify the behaviour of the system. 
Policies are one aspect of  information which influences the behaviour of objects within the 
system.   Authorisation policies define what an manager is permitted or not permitted to do. 
They constrain the information made available to managers and the operations they are 
permitted to perform on managed objects (see Figure 1). Obligation policies define what a 
manager must or must not do and hence guide the decision making process; the manager has 
to interpret policies in order to achieve the overall objectives of the organisation. 
Managed Object
Information 
Control 
Manager 
Management  
Interface 
Normal  
Interfaces  
Software  
Process 
Obligation
Policies
Interpret 
Authorisation
Policies
 
Figure 1 Policies Influence Behaviour. 
Human managers are adept at interpreting both formal and informal policy specifications 
and, if necessary, resolving conflicts when making decisions. However the size and 
complexity of large distributed systems has resulted in a trend towards automating many 
aspects of management into distributed components. If the policies are coded into these 
components they become inflexible and their behaviour can only be altered by recoding. 
There is thus a need to  specify, represent and manipulate policy information independent 
from management components to enable dynamic change of policies and reuse of these 
components with different policies. 
There may be many different policies relating to the management of a large distributed 
system, with multiple human managers specifying policy at the same time. The complexity of 
the problem makes it impossible to prevent conflicts and inconsistencies, so the policy 
service must support analysis, wherever possible, to detect these and at least warn human 
users of potential conflicts and inconsistencies.  
This paper presents the common policy concepts being used by two Esprit funded Projects – 
SysMan and IDSM which are implementing distributed management applications based on 
the use of domain and policy services.  
                                                 
1  We consider a communications network to be a distributed subsystem providing a communications 
service, within an overall distributed system which may include various other services such as storage, 
directory, time etc.  Both services and applications running above them have to managed.  The concepts 
described in this paper can be applied to management of networks, telecommunication systems or any 
other distributed systems.    
Policy Driven Management  3 13/9/94 
 
2 Management Framework 
In this section we explain the concept of domains which are important for grouping objects to 
which policies apply and show how management applications, domain and policy services fit 
within an overall management architecture. 
2.1 Domains 
Management of a distributed information system cannot be centralised in a single human or 
automated entity but must be distributed to reflect the distribution of the system being 
managed. Management must thus be structured to partition and demarcate responsibility 
amongst the multiple managers.  This structuring could reflect physical network connectivity, 
structuring of the distributed application or possibly reflect the hierarchical management 
structure (for example corporate headquarters, regional, site, departmental, and section 
management) found in many organisations. There will be a variety of managers fulfilling 
different functions and operating in different contexts, but having responsibilities for the 
same object. For example the maintenance engineer and the user of a workstation have 
different management responsibilities for the same workstation.  The management structure 
must be able to model these overlapping responsibilities. Domains provide the framework for 
partitioning management responsibility by grouping objects in order to specify a management 
policy or for whatever reason a manager wishes.  
A management domain is a collection of managed objects which have been explicitly 
grouped together for the purposes of  management.  More concretely, a domain is a managed 
object which maintains a list of references to its member managed objects. If a domain holds 
a reference to an object, the object is said to be a direct member of that domain and the 
domain is said to be its parent.  
Since a domain is itself a managed object, it may be a member of another domain and is said 
to be a subdomain of its parent. Subdomains are the means of flexibly partitioning a large 
group of objects and applying different policies to different subgroups or assigning 
responsibility for applying policy to different managers. Members of a subdomain are 
indirect members of the parent domain.  Managed objects can be direct or indirect members 
of multiple domains. When an object is a direct member of multiple domains, the parent 
domains are said to overlap. Overlapping domains thus have one or more member objects in 
common.   Domains are similar to the notion of a directory commonly found in hierarchical 
file systems.  More information on domain concepts can be found in [1,2,3] and a detailed 
specification of the domain service in [4]. 
2.2 Management Architecture 
Figure 2 shows the overall distributed management system architecture.  Rather than 
implement a single monolithic management application (MA) to perform all aspects of 
management, we have an extensible set of management applications which have a consistent 
user interface.  These make use of a common set of underlying management services for 
monitoring and manipulating domains and policies.  The management objects may interact 
using various communication services to meet the requirements of particular applications.   
Each MA may have its own managed objects grouped into domains and may have one or 
more human managers depending on the scale of the application and the need for partitioning 
responsibility. A manager “sees” all the objects (within domains) for which he is responsible 
or can access. This is analogous to accessing files and devices in a Unix system via the 
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hierarchical Unix directory.  A MA will have a user interface (UI) specific to that application 
but the UI, dealing with browsing the domain hierarchy, and specifying policy will have a 
common “look and feel” across applications. 
Although Figure 2 shows a layered hierarchy, this should not be taken too literally.  For 
example there is both a management application part and a service part for configuration, 
security and monitoring. The management applications are themselves distributed and may 
directly access distributed processing or communication services without using intermediate 
layers.  The common management services and the distributed processing services may also 
be implemented by distributed components.  The communication system and the distributed 
processing services should themselves be managed by the management applications they 
support.   All management applications interpret and apply policies and are subject to 
security to control access.  Further information on the Management Architecture can be 
found in [5] and how it is being implemented in the IDSM project in  [6]. 
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Figure 2 Distributed management system architecture  
3 Management Policy 
In this section we elaborate on the concepts of policy introduced in section 1 and show how 
domains can be used to specify the scope of a policy.  
3.1 Policy Classification 
In an object oriented approach, the external behaviour of an object defines how it interacts 
with other objects in its environment. We refine the concept of policy to be the information 
which influences the interactions between a subject and a target and so the policy specifies a 
relationship between the subject and target.  Multiple policies may apply to any object as it 
may be the subject or target of many policies.  
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3.1.1  Authorisation Policy  
Authorisation policy defines what activities a subject is permitted to do in terms of the 
operations it is authorised to perform on a target object. In general an authorisation policy 
may be positive (permitting) or negative (prohibiting) i.e. not permitted = prohibited.  
Authorisation policies are considered target based in that there is a reference monitor 
associated with the target which enforces the policy and decides whether an activity is 
permitted or prohibited.  We do not consider mandatory military type policies in this paper.   
Activity based authorisation 
The simplest policies are expressed purely in terms of subject, target and activity: 
* John is permitted to read file F1 (Positive) 
* John is prohibited to read, write or execute file F3  (Negative) 
A target based reference  monitor can then make a decision based on the subject and 
operation although an implicit subject may be specified.  
* Any object is permitted to read file F1 (Positive) 
* Any object is prohibited to write file F3  (Negative) 
State Based authorisation 
State based authorisation policies include a predicate based on object state (i.e. a value of an 
object attribute) in the policy specification.  These are common in database access control 
and safety critical systems: 
* John is permitted to read personnel records where employment grade <10 
* The operator is prohibited from performing close_valve on reactor when 
reactor.Temp > 100 
* Managers with current location = planning office are permitted to read expansion 
plans   
 (i.e. they are prohibited when visiting other locations – this assumes current location 
is an attribute of a manager). 
3.1.2  Obligation Policies 
Obligation policy defines what activities a subject must (or must not) do. The underlying 
assumption is that all subjects are well behaved, and attempt to carry out obligation policies 
with no freedom of choice. This may be true of automated subjects but will in general not be 
true of human subjects.  Obligation policies are subject based in that the subject is 
responsible for interpreting the policy and performing the activity specified.  
Activity Based Obligations 
Simple obligation policies can also be expressed in terms of subject, target and activity, but 
may also specify an event which triggers the activity.   
* The company director must protect the assets of company XYZ (Positive) 
* On error count > 100 monitoring agent must send warning message to operator 
(Positive, event triggered) 
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* The standby manager must not perform any control actions (Negative) 
* Employees must not talk about their jobs to the press (Negative) 
State Based Obligation  
An obligation may also be specified in terms of a predicate on object state.  In some cases 
this can be used to select subject or target objects to which an obligation policy applies.   
* Controller must control boiler temperature such that 50 < boiler.temp > 100  
 (Positive obligation in terms of target state) 
* Managers must perform reset on links with error count > 50   
 (Positive obligation on selected targets based on state) 
* Managers with version < 1.5 must not perform diagnostic test A500   
 (Negative obligation applying to selected subjects) 
3.1.3  Discussion 
Authorisation policies are specified to protect target objects and are usually implemented 
using security mechanisms in the operating system as subjects cannot be trusted to enforce 
them. Obligation policies are implemented by the management system  i.e. interpreted by 
managers which must be trusted.  Authorisation policies are less dynamic than obligation 
policies.  For example obligation policies may be triggered by an event which results in an 
action being performed but are effectively dormant until the event occurs again.  We have not 
identified any need for event based authorisation policies.  
A negative obligation may appear to be the same as a negative authorisation but the 
responsibility for preventing the activity lies with the subject rather than with a target based 
reference monitor. This assumes the subject is well behaved and trusted.  The subject may in 
fact be authorised to perform the activity and the negative obligation is activated to stop it on 
a temporary basis.  For example, a standby manager may normally be authorised to perform 
control actions but a negative obligation stops the standby manager.  Although it would be 
feasible to transform a negative obligation into a negative authorisation, this may be 
inconvenient due to the controls and overheads involved in introducing authorisation policies 
into the system.  Transformation to an authorisation policy is necessary if the subject cannot 
be trusted to perform a negative obligation. 
State based policies are more difficult to implement than activity based policies.  A reference 
monitor would have to query subject or target objects to check their state in order to 
determine whether to permit an action for authorisation policies [7].  A state based obligation 
policy e.g. to maintain boiler temperature between 50 and 100 cannot be directly interpreted 
by an automated manager as it needs "intelligence" to work out how to achieve the required 
goal.  The obligation could be refined into the following activity based obligations  (which 
also allow for some time lag in the boiler heater affecting temperature). 
*  On boiler.temp < 52 controller must switch on boiler heater 
* On temperature > 98 controller must switch off boiler heater 
Negative state based policies can sometimes be transformed into positive ones by modifying 
the predicate.  For example  
* The operator is permitted to close valve on reactor when reactor.Temp ≤ 100 
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is equivalent to the negative policy defined in 3.1.1 above.  This assumes there is an implicit 
negative authorisation policy forbidding any access unless a positive authorisation policy 
permits it.  Combining positive and negative policies can result in conflicts [8]. 
Wies [9] has a similar policy mode classification to the above but extends this with additional 
classification criteria such as lifetime, geographical scope, organisational structure, type of 
service, type or functionality of targets, management functionality to which the policy 
applies.  These criteria are then used to derive attributes for a policy template. 
3.2 Policy Constraints 
A constraint can optionally be defined as part of a policy specification to restrict the 
applicability of the policy. It is defined as a predicate referring to global attributes such as 
time or action parameters, as explained below.  
Temporal Constraints specify time limits before, after or between which a policy applies e.g. 
between 09.00 and 17.00 or before 31 December 1994. They may be used to specify a 
validity time or expiry time for a policy.  
Parameter value constraints define permitted values for management operations. For 
example the security policy that passwords must be greater than 6 characters in length 
and contain at least one non-alphabetic character can be considered a constraint on a 
change password operation parameter.  
Preconditions could define the resources which must be available for a management policy to 
be accomplished.  For example, a dynamic load balancing policy could specify that 
processes may be migrated to  a  machine in domain D1 with load < 60% up to limit of 
4 processes per machine.  Budget allocation is often considered a policy decision. 
Other constraints which limit the applicability of a policy can be defined as part of a selection 
expression  for a state based policy based on object attributes to select the set of subject or 
target objects within a domain to which the policy will be applied (see section 3.4 below).  
3.3 Policy as Relationship Objects  
Policies encapsulate a representation of information affecting component behaviour so we 
treat them as objects which provide operations for querying or changing policies [10]. A 
policy service then provides the operations for creating, deleting, storing and retrieving 
policy objects. Policy scope is specified using domains, so the policy service must also 
provide the ability to identify what policies apply to a domain and then use the domain 
service to identify  the objects within the domain.  There are advantages in treating policies 
as managed objects and structuring them into domains, so that an authorisation policy can be 
defined to control which managers are permitted to modify a set of policies or to define 
"meta policies" about policies (see section 4.4.). 
Another reason for an object oriented approach to policy specification is that it is useful to be 
able to define a policy class which defines most of the attributes of a particular policy. When 
specifying policies for a particular application, multiple instances of that policy can then be 
created, with remaining policy attributes being defined for the particular instance. The policy 
class is like a template with values for specific attributes being provided when a policy 
instance is created.  
Policies are not active objects in that they do not instigate management operations. Managers 
are the active objects which are responsible for interpreting an obligation policy and 
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performing the activities specified. A reference monitor uses information such as an access 
control list derived from  authorisation policies to decide whether to permit an operation [11].  
Managed Object  
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Manager 
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Policy
Reflexive Management
Policy
Accounting Domain 
Security Domain 
Policy
= Manager = Managed Object  
Figure 3 Typical Management Relationships 
Figure 3 also shows that a policy may specify a reflexive relationship, whereby managers are 
members of the managed domain and so could be both subjects and targets of the 
management policy. This reflects the fact that managers may manage themselves in some 
circumstances e.g. authorised to approve their own expenses.   There is no restriction on the 
type of object within a single domain so the policy may need to specify the type of object to 
which it applies unless it is applicable to all objects in the domain.  
The OSI Manager, agent,  managed object relationships [12] can be modelled by 2 sets of 
policies – policies which specify the relationship between the Manager and the agent and 
those which specify the relationship between the agent and the managed objects for which it 
is responsible. The latter are probably implicit as OSI management does not really consider 
agents to be intelligent and make management decisions.   
3.4 Policy Scope Specification 
In very large systems, the number of objects is so large that it is impractical to specify 
policies for individual objects. Instead it should be specified for sets of objects.  The set of 
objects to which a policy applies could be specified in terms of object attributes e.g. a 
particular type of object or those objects in a particular state. A search over all reachable 
objects, within a distributed system, to determine these sets is impractical. The number of 
reachable objects within a large scale distributed system, is potentially millions and is not 
known a priori. The selection of objects is thus limited to be within the scope of a domain. 
This limits the search space for object selection to a predefined set to make sure the selection 
terminates within a defined time.  For example the policy  
* Kevin must install new kernel on workstations with workstation type=Sparc IPX  
is impractical as there are potentially millions of such workstations connected to the internet, 
so the scope should be limited as in the following policy.    
* Kevin must install new kernel on workstations in domain dse.doc.ic.ac.uk with 
workstation type=Sparc IPX  
Another advantage of specifying policy scope in terms of domains is that objects can be 
added and removed from domains to which policies apply without having to change the 
policies. 
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3.4.1 Propagation to Subdomains 
Policies apply to sets of objects within domains, but domains may contain subdomains. To 
avoid having to respecify policy for each subdomain, policy applying to a parent domain, 
should propagate to member subdomains of the parent. For example a policy applying to an 
organisation should also apply to departments within that organisation. A subdomain is said 
to inherit, the policy applying to parent domains (but this is not the same as object oriented 
inheritance).  With policy propagation, a policy specified for a domain is applied recursively 
to all direct and indirect members of that domain. For example, in Figure 4 the policy 
specified between D1 and D2 will propagate to managers in D2 and the managed objects in 
D4 and D5. 
D5O1 O2
O3
O4
O5M2
D1
D2
D3
M1
M3
Policy  
Specification 
O6
O7
O8
D4
Managers Managed Objects  
Figure 4 Policy Propagation 
It should be possible to override the default policy propagation either at the policy or domain 
level. A policy may specify that it applies only to direct members of the target or subject 
domains. A domain attribute may specify that any policy applying to the domain does not 
propagate to indirect members, irrespective of what is specified in the policy.  
In order to efficiently determine the policies applying to a domain and hence to an object 
within it, the domain must hold references to those policies.   
3.4.2 Set Selection 
A policy should be able to select the set of subject or target objects within a domain to which 
it applies using a predicate based on the values of object attributes. The simplest case occurs 
when a policy applies to all objects in a domain.  The set of objects to which a policy applies 
has to be evaluated at the time the policy is interpreted because domain membership can 
change dynamically. Object selection is based on Scope Expressions which define a (possibly 
empty) set of objects and are based on combinations of the following: 
i) The object itself. 
ii) Direct and indirect members of the domain i.e. policy is applied recursively to all 
subdomains which are members or indirect members of the domain.  
iii) Limited propagation. i.e. policy is applied recursively to a limited number of levels of 
subdomains which are members the domain.  
iv) A predicate based on object attributes is used to select objects. For example the policy 
applies to objects of a particular type or in a particular state. A location constraint may 
limit the applicability of an authorisation policy in terms of the location from which 
operations on the objects can be invoked e.g. a file can only be read from terminals in a 
particular office.  Evaluating a set of objects, using a predicate based on an object 
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attribute value together with policy propagation, could be very expensive to implement 
in a distributed system. 
v) A set expression in terms of members of the domain can be evaluated to give a set. 
vi) Any objects - this allows an implicit scope. For example any manager may be 
authorised to perform an operation on an object. “Any” is only permitted as the subject 
scope for an authorisation policy or the target scope for an obligation policy. 
The use of “any” as the subject of an obligation policy does not make sense as no specific 
subject has the responsibility to carry out the actions.  We have not identified a use for “any” 
as the target for authorisation policy. 
3.4.3 Scope Expressions 
Scope Expressions always return a set of objects and are defined as follows:- 
SE ::=  “ANY” | SC_EXPR 
SC_EXPR ::= object |  
   { object } | 
   *object | 
   * NUMBER object | 
   SC_EXPR + SC_EXPR | 
   SC_EXPR - SC_EXPR | 
   SC_EXPR ^ SC_EXPR | 
   select( pred, SC_EXPR ) | 
   ( SC_EXPR ) 
Operators 
+ set union 
-  set difference 
^ set intersection 
* this returns a set that contains all direct and indirect members of the domain if it is 
applied on a domain object ; otherwise it returns a set that contains the object itself. 
* NUMBER   a set that contains all direct and indirect members of the domain as far down as 
the NUMBER’th level if it is applied on a domain object returns.  That is, *1D1 gives 
the set of direct members of domain D1.  If applied to an object it returns a set that 
contains the object itself. 
{ } returns a set that contains the object on which it is applied i.e. it converts a single 
object to a set containing that object. It is only needed for set theory consistency, as 
the operators (+, -, ^) are only applied to sets of objects. There is no ambiguity if it 
is omitted. 
object shorthand version or saying { object } 
select(pred, sc_expr )  returns a sub-set of the set returned by sc_expr with the members of 
the selected set determined by the predicate. The predicate will typically be a 
function which is applied to all members of the set returned by sc_expr. 
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The interpretation of the expressions is from left to right.  
Operators can be divided into two categories. The first category includes the set operators (+, 
-, ^) which are applied to sets of objects. The second one includes the object operators (*,  { 
}) that are applied to objects and return a set of objects. The set that the object operators 
return is evaluated by traversing the domain hierarchy starting with the domains referenced in 
the expression.     
For example, referring to Figure 4: 
• *1D4-O3+*1D5 = union of direct members of D4 (except O3) and D5 = 
{O4,O5,O6,O7,O8} 
• *D4^*D5 = intersection of direct and indirect members of D4 and of direct and 
indirect members of D5 = {O6, O5}. 
• *D3 = all direct and indirect members of D3 = {O1,O2,O3,O4,O5,O6,O7, 
O8,D4,D5} 
• select(type!=Domain, *1D4-O3+*1D5) = non-domain members of the set of 
the union of direct members of D4 (except O3) and D5 = {O4,O5,O6,O7,O8}. 
4 Example Policy Objects 
A policy object specification defines the following attributes: 
i) Modality: positive or negative authorisation, positive or negative obligation  (i.e. A+, 
A-, O+, O-) 
ii) A subject which defines one or more manager domain scopes 
iii) A target which defines one or more managed domain scopes affected by the activity 
iv) An activity which define a set of actions or permitted operations 
v) Constraints which apply to the activity 
Example policies with these characteristics are given below. 
4.1  Access Rules 
An access rule is a simple example of a management authorisation policy which specifies a 
relationship between managers (in a subject scope domain) and managed objects (in a target 
scope domain) in terms of the management operations permitted on objects of a specific type.   
The access rule may also define constraints on these operations (see 3.2 above) and make use 
of scope expressions to select subsets of the objects within the subject or target domains.  In 
Figure 5, operations OpA and OpB are permitted on objects of type T1 and operations OpX 
and  OpZ on objects of type T2.  These operations can only be performed between hours of 
09.00 to 17.00.   Examples of the use of access rules for service specification can be found in 
[2]. 
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Figure 5 Access Rules 
4.2  Domain Membership Policy 
A manager can specify the initial membership of a domain by specifying an object selection 
predicate for searching a database or another domain, but this is not provided as part of the 
basic domain service. Membership policies are then needed to constrains the objects which 
can be subsequently created in the domain or included from another domain. Other 
membership policies relate to the number of objects permitted in a domain. Example 
membership policies are given below.   
• Only objects which implement a particular interface type can be members of the 
domain i.e. any subject is permitted to include or create objects of type T in target 
domain Dt. 
  A+ any {include X, create X} Dt when X.type=T 
• A domain of managers can have only a single manager to prevent conflicts between 
multiple managers. 
  A+ any {include, create} Dt when Dt.membernum = 0 
• There must always be at least two objects in a domain for backup purposes. This also 
requires an obligation policy for a manager in domain Ds, on receiving a failure event, 
to delete the failed object and create a new one. 
  A- any {remove, delete} Dt when Dt.membernum > 2; 
  O+ on fail(X) Ds {delete X; create X} Dt 
• An object should always be a member of at least one domain if it is to be managed 
using the domain based management applications mentioned in section 2, so a policy 
could specify that removing it from a target domain Dt is only permitted if has more 
than one parent. 
  A+ any {remove X} Dt when X.parentnum > 1 
4.3  Delegation 
In some applications a manager may delegate an activity to a proxy manager (or agent) to 
perform on his behalf.   There is a need to control to whom the managers can delegate and 
what operations they can delegate.  This type of policy requires two subject domains – for the 
delegator and delegatee.  The policy shown in Figure 6 permits Managers in Domain D1 to 
delegate the right to perform operations OpA and OpC on target objects of Type T1 in 
Domain D2, to a proxy manager in Domain D3.  The policy expires after  31 December 1994. 
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 T1: OpA, OpC
D2
Target
D3
D1
Managers Delegatee D3
Constraint 
Expiry 31 Dec 1994
Proxy Manager  
Figure 6  Delegation of rights. 
The implementation of this type of policy requires extended access control lists which 
contain information on delegatees as well as subjects.   
4.4  Security Administrator 
Opa Opj 
Member of SA Domain 
can create this 
access rule 
AR permitted subjects 
Dept ADeptA_Users DeptA_Files 
AR permitted targets
AR permitted operations: Opa..Opj 
SA Domain 
(Subject Scope) 
Operation: Create Access Rules (AR) 
Constraint: Policy subject not in   
                   AR permitted subjects
Managed   
Domain  
(Target Scope)
Access Rule Domain
 
Figure 7 Authorisation Policy for a Security Administrator (SA) 
A security administrator (SA) in a commercial environment would typically create access 
rules (ARs) for other subjects (excluding himself) to access specific target resources.  The 
authorisation policy applying to the SA should limit the subjects for whom he can create 
ARs, the target objects to which the rules can apply and the operations specified by the ARs.   
This is a meta-policy about managing policy objects (access rules) and also specifies a 
relationship between multiple domains.  It is the most complicated of the examples.   Figure 7 
shows there are a number of scopes which limit the ARs which can be created. AR permitted 
subjects specifies to whom access can be given, the AR permitted targets define the set of 
target objects to which access can be given, and an AR permitted operations define the set of 
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operations which can be included in access rules. The principle of separation of responsibility 
means the SA should not be permitted to give access to himself, so the subject should not be 
a member of the AR permitted subjects. If we consider ARs as objects which are created in 
domains, there is a target domain in which the SA is permitted to create ARs.  
Interpreting policy objects such as those relating to a security administrator is considerably 
more complicated than simple access rules. It would be the function of the policy service to 
interpret and enforce this policy as it relates to creating policy objects. 
4.5 Responsibility 
The concept of responsibility can be modelled as an obligation policy.  For example consider 
that manager X has responsibility to update software in a domain of workstations.   Manager 
Y is his superior and has ultimate responsibility to determine the work is carried out 
correctly.    This is modelled using two different obligation policies, one to perform the 
updating and one to indicate the responsibility relationship as shown in Figure 8.   
Update 
software
Manager 
XManager Y
Report 
result
Reporting 
Responsibility
Action 
Responsibility
Update 
software
Manager 
X
Manager 
Y
Check 
activity, state
Monitoring 
Responsibility
Action 
Responsibility
a) Reporting Responsibility:  X is responsible to Y
b) Subject Monitoring:  Y is responsible for X
Update 
software
Manager 
X
Manager 
Y
Check 
activity, state
Monitoring 
Responsibility
Action 
Responsibility
c) Target Monitoring:  Y is responsible for target objects.  
Figure 8 Modelling Responsibility as Obligation Policies.   
5 Policy Implementation Issues 
A Policy Dissemination Function transforms policies into a form suitable for interpretation 
or enforcement and sends obligation policies to managers in the subject domain and 
authorisation policies to reference monitors associated with objects in the target domain.   An 
example transformation is an authorisation policy object into an access control list (ACL) 
entry or capability.  ACLs are stored with the target domain and have to be propagated to 
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nested subdomains [13].  The authorisation policies have been applied to specifying service 
access rights for cellular networks [2]. 
The generalised policy concepts were derived from our initial work on access control policy, 
so the authorisation policy aspects are further advanced than the obligation policy concepts.  
We are experimenting with a notation which can be used for both authorisation and 
obligation policies as they have similar attributes but the respective implementation 
mechanisms are very different.  Obligation policies are of the form  
 O+ | O-  [on  <event>] <subject>  {actions} <target> [when  <constraint>] 
where the action is triggered by an event  occurring and the action could be specified by a C 
language procedure.  The constraint is a predicate which is evaluated when the event occurs 
and can be used to inhibit the action being performed.  The event and constraint expression 
are optional.    In particular this has been applied to a monitoring service where these policy 
rules can be used to combine and filter events or generate higher level event reports [14].  We 
are developing graphical tools for specifying both authorisation and management policy.   
The IDSM partners  are using their proprietary Network Management platforms to implement 
policies and domains as OSI managed objects in special Management Information Bases 
(MIBs) [6, 15] supported by service managed objects.  These implementations use the 
Network Management Option within OSF's DME to access OSI and SNMP managed objects 
via the XMP interface [16].   A management agent uses the authorisation policies to make 
access control decisions for management operations.  Reporting obligation policies for 
generating event messages are being translated into event forwarding discriminator managed 
objects.  The SysMan project is using ANSAware [17], which is a distributed object oriented 
programming environment so domains, policies and the distributed servers which store them 
can be directly implemented as Ansa objects.  One of the commercial partners is porting this 
implementation to a CORBA  platform [18]. 
6 Manager Roles 
6.1 Conceptual Issues 
The concept of a role is well understood in enterprise modelling and there is an extensive 
literature relating to role theory [19]. Role Theory postulates that individuals occupy 
positions in an organisation. Associated with each position is a set of activities including 
required interactions that constitute the role of that position.  
A manager role is defined as the set of authorisation and obligation policies for which a 
particular manager position is the subject.   A role thus identifies the authority, responsibility, 
functions and interactions, associated with a position within an organisation. Example 
manager positions could include managing director, security administrator, operations 
manager, operator responsible for North Region. A person may be assigned to one or more 
roles and multiple individuals can share a single role. 
A manager position defines a particular position within an organisation, such as financial 
manager, managing director, to which different people may be assigned over a period of 
time. The role refers to a manager position rather than a particular person, because people are 
frequently assigned to new roles, and it would be very time consuming to change policies 
which reference that person. Within the management environment the functions and authority 
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of a human or automated manager is defined in terms of the obligation and authorisation 
policies which apply to the manager position. This defines the overall functionality of the 
position. A role may also relate to an automated manager, although it is less likely to be 
frequently reassigned to new roles. 
Policies which have propagated down to a position, but do not explicitly reference the 
position are not included in the set of role policies. Propagated policies are part of the 
organisation policies as they may also apply to different roles or objects, and are not specific 
to the manager position which is the subject of the role.  
It would be very useful to be able to parameterise a role with specific positions and target 
domains. It would thus be possible to define the role policy set as a class from which 
particular instances can be created. For example a role could be defined for a region manager 
and this could be used to create North, South, East and West region manager roles. Each of 
the 4 roles instances relates to different manager positions each with their own specific target 
domains, but specifies the same policy activities and constraints for each manager position.  
6.2 Implementation Issues 
It is assumed that the humans occupying roles will perform management functions related to 
the distributed system and so have to be represented within the system by an adapter object 
which interacts with a suitable presentation device (workstation or terminal).  We now show 
how the domains described in section 2.1 can be used to represent Users and Positions.   
The policies applying to a person are defined in terms of a User Representation Domain 
(URD) which is a persistent representation of the person or human manager. When the 
person logs into the system an adapter object is created within the URD to interact with the 
person's workstation. The policies specified for the domain apply to the adapter object 
representing the person (c.f. DME adapters  [16]). 
Policies relating to a role should be independent of the person occupying that role so should 
not reference a URD. Instead, a Position Domain is created and policies pertaining to the 
role are specified with the position domain as a subject (see figure 9). Allocating a person to 
a position is accomplished by including his URD within the position domain. Role policies 
propagate to the URD and hence apply to the manager adapter object. The manager may be a 
member of multiple position domains if performing multiple management roles. Multiple 
URDs may be included in a position domain indicating a shared position but obviously this 
would require the managers to coordinate their activities via a suitable protocol.  
User Representation  
 Domain 
Manager  
adapter  
object
Manager Position Domain   
Policy  
Set 
Role
 
Figure 9 Position Domains and Roles 
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The set of policies associated with a role could be stored in a single domain for ease of 
reference, by the manager, but this is not shown in figure 9.  However propagated polices 
would not be defined specifically for the position domain so may be stored elsewhere.  The 
issues related to storing policies in domains requires further study.  
The implication of parameterised roles is that it must be possible to define a policy class 
object which can have some attributes predefined but others can be defined as parameters 
which are provided when a policy instance is created.  
7 Policy Hierarchy 
Policy can be expressed as a hierarchy where a high level policy goal can be refined into 
multiple levels of lower level policy and eventually into a set of policy rules [20].  
• Policy goals define activities in terms of actions and operations which have to be 
transformed or refined before they can be executed by managers or target managed 
objects. Policy goals will have to be interpreted by human managers or, in some cases, 
by an expert system capable of application dependent goal refinement.    
• Policy Rules define activities in terms of actions or operations which can be directly 
executed by manager or managed objects c.f. access rules. These could be interpreted 
by automated tools. 
• Policy Mechanism Information may be generated from policy rules for efficient 
implementation of policy mechanisms e.g. transforming access rules into access control 
lists or capabilities for actually controlling access at run time [11,13, 15]. 
Both goals and rules can be expressed as obligation or authorisation policies and be 
represented by a policy object with the attributes of subject, target, constraints and activities. 
A high level obligation or authorisation policy may be refined into a number of lower level 
obligation and authorisation policies.  For example a high level goal: 
* O+ Manager M must protect Dept. D files from loss due to 
fire or media failure 
could be refined, via many intermediate more detailed policies, into the following set of 
implementable ones in which an archiver (in Domain BackupSW) performs a backup to tape 
followed by one to a remote store.  Authorisation policies are needed to permit backup 
software to read and mark files and to perform file transfer to  the remote store address 
passed as a parameter.  
* O+ At 22.00 every Thursday archiver {tape_backup} Domain 
Dfiles 
* O+  At 03.00 every Friday archiver  
{remote_backup (safestore1.ic.ac.uk)} Domain Dfiles 
* A+ Domain BackupS/W{read, write} Domain Dfiles 
* A+ Domain BackupS/W {file_transfer, file_access} Domain 
safestores 
The distinction between goals, rules and mechanisms is not fundamental. What is considered 
a goal at one time may eventually become a rule or a mechanism with improvements in 
technology and implementations techniques.  Thus we use the same concept of a policy 
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object for all levels of abstraction in the policy hierarchy, but some policies may only be 
interpretable by humans.   
The motivation for understanding hierarchical relationships between policies is to determine 
what is required for the satisfaction of policies. If a high-level policy is defined or changed, it 
should be possible to decide what lower-level policies must be created or changed. The 
ultimate aim is to be able to specify high-level policies and automatically generate the lower-
level ones but this is similar to automatically generating code from abstract requirements 
specifications and this is very difficult to achieve.  
Another motivation is for analysis to see whether the set of lower-level policies actually fulfil 
the higher-level policy, by providing complete cover over all the target objects and actually 
meeting the policy goals. Again this can be very difficult to achieve.  The issues relating to 
refinement and analysis of Policy Hierarchies are discussed in [21].  Other discussions on 
policy hierarchies can be found in [9, 22]. 
8 Policy Analysis 
In general multiple policies apply to an object. For example an obligation policy will specify 
an activity that a manager must do and there should be a corresponding authorisation policy 
permitting the manager to perform the activity. However a set of policies may cause 
problems, because of omissions or incorrect policy specifications. A conflict between 
policies may result in a manager being unable to perform its activities.  The managers may 
not attempt to perform the activities they are permitted to do or they may be sufficiently 
intelligent to avoid conflicts, as is often the case with human managers.  Managers need tools 
to analyse the set of policies stored in the policy service to detect any of the following 
conditions which may otherwise result in problems within the management system. 
i) Coverage 
This involves checking whether derived lower level policies cover all the objects specified in 
a higher level policy.  The simplest case occurs when a target set is partitioned by creating 
multiple policies, corresponding to the same activity as the original but applying to a 
subdomain of the original target domain. It is comparatively easy to check that every member 
of the original policy's target set is a member of at least one target set of derived higher level 
policies. Determining that at least one authorisation policy applies to every object so that it 
can be managed should also be practical.  Coverage analysis is a subset of the more general 
problem of completeness analysis which is notoriously difficult to achieve.  
ii) Missing Obligation/Authorisation 
As obligation and authorisation policies are considered independent, in theory there should 
be both an obligation and authorisation policy for a manager to perform an activity. The 
existence of an obligation without a corresponding authorisation for the activity prevents the 
obligation being performed. However it may be valid for authorisation policies to exist 
without the corresponding obligation. For example a back up manager may have 
authorisation policies permitting various actions, but the corresponding obligation policies 
are created only if the primary manager fails.   
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iii) Conflicts 
A conflict may occur between any two policies if one policy prevents the activities of another 
policy from being performed or if the policies interfere in some way that may result in the 
managed objects being put into unwanted states. As the activity of a policy can specify a set 
of actions, there may also be conflicts between these actions within a single policy.  Our 
model of management policies represents both subjects and target objects as sets of objects. 
A conflict may occur between two or more policies if there is an overlap between the subject 
and/or target object sets. The overlap relationship between sets of objects exists when their 
intersection is non-empty.  
Obvious conflicts occur if there is both a positive and negative authorisation or obligation 
policy with the same subjects, targets and actions.   It is not practical to forbid overlaps as 
they are very useful for many situations. A set of managers may perform different 
management activities on disjoint target domains, resulting in subject overlap. Target 
overlaps occur when managers who do not have full responsibility for a particular target 
domain, are given limited rights to perform some activities (e.g. query state or perform 
diagnostics) as they make use of a service provided by the objects in the target domain. In 
many cases, the fact that a conflict may occur does not mean it will occur.  Policy conflicts 
are discussed in more detail in [8]. 
The problems of detecting conflicts is extremely difficult. Most existing work relates to 
authorisation  policy [23].  Analysis of the policy objects without any knowledge of the 
application or activities may detect positive-negative conflicts of modalities and conflicts 
between obligation and authorisation policies, and so it may be possible to automate this.   
Most other conflicts require application dependent knowledge about the activities specified 
in the policies to detect whether there is potential conflict. This is likely to require human 
intervention.  We are experimenting with tools to detect positive/negative conflicts and 
missing authorisation policy.   
9 Related Work 
The ESPRIT funded DOMAINS project also worked on Domain based policy management 
[20, 24, 25].  Their policies and managers were included in the domain being managed.  
There was a single manger in a domain which had unlimited access to all managed objects in 
that domain, so they did not really consider authorisation policy.  Although some members of 
the DOMAINS project are working in the IDSM project, the DOMAINS’ approach was not 
considered sufficiently flexible to cope with inter-organisation systems where managers and 
the objects they may manage are inherently in different domains.  The DOMAINS project 
had the concept of high level goals being translated into policies which were then translated 
into sets of plans.    In our approach, goals are abstract policies interpreted by humans and 
rules are more concrete ones, possibly interpreted by automated managers.  We consider that 
all types of policies should be represented as objects with subject, target, actions and 
constraints as attributes and that there may be more than 3 levels of abstraction. 
Roos et. al. [26] take a similar approach to our concepts of policies and domains, but their 
policy objects have two parts.  A passive relationship object is very similar to our policy 
objects and defines a relationship between a manager and target domains.  The second part is 
an active policy object which is a form of proxy manager which tries to achieve the goals 
specified in the passive policy on behalf of the manager.   This active policy object would 
poll the managed objects in the domain and perform management operations on them.  We 
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would model this as a hierarchical management structure with one set of policies defining the 
manager to proxy relationship and another set of policies defining the role of the manager 
proxy with respect to the target domains.  Wies also has active policy objects for enforcement 
and monitoring of policy [27].   All these policy specifications, which define a manager or 
proxy's behaviour, look like management algorithms i.e. the policy is now encoded into 
proxy managers.  We do not think that the policy service should be used as the means of 
distributing the management function.  Meyer  [28] has a notation for specifying manager 
behaviour as  policies, but it look like a manager programming language.  Policies need to be 
sufficiently abstract to be interpreted by managers or reference monitors so that they can be 
changed dynamically.   
The International Standards Organisation (ISO) WG4 are trying to define standards for 
domains and policies [29, 30], but the work is still very unstable.  Our work has been 
provided as input to this committee, but it is our view that as there is no consensus on what 
constitutes management policy, it is inappropriate to be trying to standardise concepts for 
which research is in its infancy.   
There are a number of groups working on aspects of security policy [31,32] but they do not 
cater for large scale distributed systems.  The Miro tools [23] provide a graphical means of 
specifying an access matrix for file system security.  This notation is very similar to the 
diagrams shown in this paper.  They also permit positive and negative authorisation policies 
and they have a tool which checks for ambiguities or conflicts.    There is a constraint 
language which limits the set of diagrams to be those which are realisable or acceptable.  
This can be used to define a “meta” policy about what authorisation policies are acceptable 
for a particular site.  The Miro tools appear to be the most developed but our experience from 
experimenting with them is that they are very slow and could not be used for a large number 
of policies.  They have not been used for obligation policies but they are quite general and 
probably could be adapted for this use.  They do not have any support for distribution. 
Jonscher’s work on modelling access behaviour of database users also has some similarity to 
our approach [33].  His access rights compare to our authorisation policies and his normative 
rights have some similarity to our obligation policy although he models both duties and 
(liberties) freedoms to do actions.  We are not convinced of the need for liberties in 
management policy.  We intend to take a similar approach, for our obligation policies,  to the 
triggered actions he uses for duties and liberties. 
Lomita is a rule based language for programming the management layer in the Meta system 
[34].   Lomita rules are of the form on condition do action,  which is also similar to Jonschers 
triggered actions, but there is no explicit  subject or target  – they are defined implicitly. 
The Methods specification language (MSL) [22, 35] was developed for specifying policies 
such as those relating to scheduling for large mainframes, but has not been applied to 
distributed systems.  It takes an artificial intelligence approach of choosing from a set of 
potentially conflicting goals by assigning priorities to the goals.  The implementation makes 
use of an object oriented database to hold the information for policy based decision making.   
There are various forms of Deontic Logic which have operators that denote obligation and 
permission, which at first sight seem very similar to our obligation and authorisation policy 
[36].  In most of these obligation implies permission or sometimes permission for an action 
means not being obliged to refrain from an action.  In our approach obligation and 
authorisation policies can be specified independently, although obligation without 
authorisation can lead to conflicts.   
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A more detailed survey of policy specification can be found in [37]. 
10 Conclusions 
Policy driven management provides the basis for dealing with automated management of 
large scale distributed systems and networks.  The specification and  manipulation of policy 
will become one of the key research area in the next few years.  
This paper has shown that the concept of a passive policy object can be used to model a wide 
range of authorisation and obligation policies. This policy object defines a relationship 
between one or more subject and one or more target domains; specifies the actions the 
subject performs on the target and specifies a constraint to limit the applicability of the 
policy.  The same concept can be applied to high-level (unimplementable) goals interpreted 
by humans and to low level implementable rules to be interpreted by automated objects.   
A policy specification language should not be a programming language for implementing 
proxy managers but should produce a set of rules which can be interpreted by managers for 
obligation policies and reference monitors for authorisation policies.  This is essential to 
permit easy change of policy, without reimplementation of management components, to 
change system behaviour.   
Domains are used to specify the scope for applying the policy.  We anticipate that domains 
will be used to group objects to which particular policies apply, although a policy can select a 
subset of members of a domain to which it will apply using domain set expressions or 
predicates based on object attributes.  This simple domain concept can also be used to 
represent a user or a position within an organisation. 
These concepts can be implemented in any object based environment and implementations on 
OSI based Network management, ANSAware and CORBA platforrms are being produced in 
the SYSMAN and IDSM projects.  The industrial partners have a commitment to integrate 
these into their relevant commercial products soon after the project ends.   
This document has clarified the concepts relating to using policy to influence  management of 
distributed systems.  Many issues remain to be solved.  Automatically, deriving low level  
policies from high level ones is as difficult as deriving programs from requirements 
specifications.  Policy analysis, conflict detection and resolution are also important area 
requiring considerable research.   
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